Discrete Idiosyncratic Goods and Structural Principles of Distributive Justice

Abstract

Our aim is to draw a set of distinctions among types of goods which has significant implications for theories of distributive justice. We begin by providing a general account of two sets of properties--fungibility and nonfungibility, divisibility and indivisibility--and argue that goods can be distinguished according to these criteria. Further, we contend that these distinctions entail complications for structural principles of distributive justice (i.e., principles such as maximin that distribute payoffs to positions). As an example we consider James Fishkin's discussion of structural principles, arguing that Fishkin's view that (i) value, structure, and assignment are independent holds only to the degree that the goods considered are fungible and divisible, (ii) structural principles face difficulties beyond those which Fishkin identifies and addresses with his principle of nontyranny, since structural principles cannot accommodate highly nonfungible, indivisible goods, and (iii) these difficulties can ...