Abstract
This article finds that in contrast to other cases of civil–military relations in the region, Libya does not fit a regular praetorian stereotype; rather, the interaction between its armed forces and their civilian counterparts has been paternalistic in nature. As a result, the Libyan military was the subject of destructive civilian interference throughout its modern history, and therefore incapable of delivering on its raison d’être, i.e., defence. This curious and ultimately negative interplay between civilian and military leaders in Libya draws attention to the generally understudied role of Arab civilians in the control of armed forces outside democratic structures – and highlights the state-fracturing consequences of this type of interaction.
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