Lessons Learned? German Security Policy and the War in Afghanistan

Abstract

The mission in Afghanistan revealed fundamental shortcomings, inconsistencies and contradictions of core elements of German security policy. In an effort to contribute to the debate about the factors that account for the idiosyncrasies of German security policy, the purpose of this study is to assess how far Germany learned lessons from its policy failures in Afghanistan. The study introduces a typology of learning, which is mainly based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF); delineates the German security policy belief system; and explores two prominent cases of policy failure: the deployment of the Bundeswehr and leadership of the international police training mission. Utilising different sources of data, the study confirms assumptions of the ACF about the stability of core beliefs and shows that the lack of precise policy objectives was a significant barrier to learning. Instead of clarifying Germany's strategic viewpoint, Afghanistan has further enhanced its disorientation in security policy.