Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados Pessoais: uma análise econômica sobre o seu regime de responsabilidade

Abstract

Considering the controversies related to the Brazilian General Data Protection Law (LGPD) liability regime, this paper aims to examine the kind of liability which would be more efficient as the one capable to maximize social welfare, pursuant to Law and Economics Theory. After a brief study over the liability regimes, a doctrinal discussion concerning this paper theme is presented followed by its economic analysis. We conclude that LGPD authorizes the construction of two distinct regimes: strict, to consumer relations and negligence rule with the defense of contributory negligence, to other cases. We verify that more precaution is not always socially desirable and that the outcome shall be efficient provided that the potential offender assumes the burden of evidence costs. Thereby, the liability regime may be the strict one or the negligence rule with the defense of contributory negligence. Specifically, in consumer relations the strict liability seems to be more efficient.