Abstract
Abstract There is general agreement that the Viet-minh made concessions, at the Geneva conference (1954), under pressure by China ; and that the latter was largely motivated by the threat of intervention. As the U.S.A. were at first hostile to the partition of Vietnam, one wonders whether they could have exerted a stronger pressure. This article stresses the technical obstacles, which, in addition to political problems, excluded the Vautour operation ; also the divergences between and Washington's points of view, which made very hazardous an American military intervention in North Vietnam, after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. There was also great caution on President Eisenhower's part, as he was anxious to avoid the U.S.A. to be dragged into a conflict with China.
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