Abstract

The Luxembourg Constitutional Court, provided for by the amendment to the Constitution of 12 July 1996 and created by the law of 27 July 1997, is at present the last body of constitutional law to be set up in Western Europe. Is it possible however to liken it to the "European model of Constitutional Courts ", or does it present particulars when compared with its elders ? In that the Luxembourg Constituent chose to set up a special jurisdiction in charge of monitoring the conformity of laws to the Constitution, and as a consequence refused to entrust such monitoring to ordinary judges, the case of Luxembourg may without any doubt be likened to other European Constitutional Courts. Parallels likewise appear between the make up and operation of the Luxembourg Constitutional Court and those of European Courts. Indeed the independence of constitutional judges from the appointing authority, the statutory autonomy of the Court, and the implementation of specifie rules in matters of procedure are characteristics shared by European bodies of constitutional law. The Luxembourg Constitutional Court however shows some originality in these areas. The appointment of Luxembourg constitutional judges is thus characterised by the cooperation between the executive and judiciary, free of any interference by the legislative. In the same way, decrees passed by the Court only have a relative authority as absolute judgment. It is however at the level of referrai and jurisdiction that the Luxembourg Constitutional Court presents significant characteristics. Cases may indeed only be laid before the Court by the ordinary judge within the framework of a suit along which an interlocutory question arises regarding compliance with the Constitution. Both the country 's political authorities and individual persons are thus excluded from the Court's referral. The Court's competence is also much more limited thon that of other European Constitutional Courts. It is only in charge of the control of the constitutionality of laws, to the exclusion of any other duties such as contentious electoral matters or the control of jurisdictional conflicts, and although it may control the constitutionality of laws, international agreements are excluded from its jurisdiction.

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