La construcción jurisprudencial del principio de responsabilidad del Estado desde la autonomía procesal y sus límites (equivalencia y efectividad)

Abstract

Spain’s infringement of the principle of effectiveness, motivated by the legal regime applicable to the liability of the State-legislator, does not precisely strike out as surprising. The judgment Commission v Spain contains, however, a novel and worrying development with regard to the principle of equivalence – a principle that, according to the judgment, has not been infringed by national legislation, which mandates that the Brasserie conditions be applied to claims for damages based on EU law, whereas such conditions are not applicable to claims for damages caused by laws declared unconstitutional. On this point, the judgment presents important challenges that cast doubt on its coherence with previous case law and with the very raison d’être of the principle of equivalence. The ruling leaves open key questions on the true legal nature of effectiveness and equivalence and their relationship with the principles of equality and effective judicial protection. Are these genuine autonomous general principles? Should their scope of application be determined following the same rules as the Charter? And ultimately, are the conclusions on the scope of application of the principle of equivalence defined in this ruling applicable to the scope of application of the Charter itself?