Abstract
The aim of this contribution is to explore the relationship and possible interactions between phenomenology and neuroscience regarding the intersubjectivity and the experience of the other. Through the analysis of the theory of “mirror neurons”, embodied simulation (neuroscientific domain), and the analysis of Husserl's theory of empathy (phenomenological domain), one can see how much the attempt to reduce the phenomenological experience of intersubjectivity to the neural mechanisms is unfounded and unproductive.
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