Korean and Asian Security after the Framework Agreement

Abstract

The end of the Cold War set in motion a number of changes in Korean and Asian security patterns that are continuing to affect Russia, both Korean states, and all the major players in Asia. As ideological bases for politics have eroded, states are now free to forge new relationships across old divides. This is most apparent on the Korean peninsula where both the ROK and the DPRK have taken advantage of new opportunities to reach out to the United States and Japan and to Russia and China. This new flexibility comes very much at the expense of Russia which still is unable to devise either a coherent policy process or security strategy in Asia. But not only have the two Koreas benefited, China and the US have been able to forge new relationships with former enemies as well. Thus, the Asian scene as a whole, e.g., Central Asia as well, will be characterized by shifting relationships and weakening alliance patterns as states have increasing scope and reasons for making their own short-term flexible arrangements. Similarly, the debate on multilateralism will continue but the results are pretty meager as the United States and others either ignore it in practice or use the term to define a continuing series of bilateral alliances. This means that there are going to be mainly short-term arrangements and endless movement in the relationships of Asia-Pacific states, not a real order. This is dangerous for the future because many of the conditions for an arms race are present. The foregoing conditions make it essential that the United States, the one power that can provide the basis for a legitimating order in Asia on the basis of the region`s economic, defense, and political relations, do so in strategic fashion and reverse the previous drift that has developed.