Abstract
In September 1983, Soviet planes shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, provoking an exercise in crisis rhetoric by President Reagan and members of his administration. A case study of the incident illuminates the interactive nature of context, public knowledge, and rhetorical situation. Errors in argumentation strategy undermined the American position, raising doubts about U.S. complicity in the tragedy and enabling the Soviet Union to present a plausible explanation for its action.
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