Abstract
THIS PAPER studies Japan's policies in the Asian Development Bank 1(ADB) . Japan has enjoyed a dominant position in the ADB, different from other international organizations of which it is a member. Japan has been a major donor and assumed top managerial positions since the bank was founded in August 1966. The ADB was the first international institution created and led by Japanese. This case thus provides a glimpse of Japan's behavior as a dominant power in international institutions. My central question is whether Japan's power position in the ADB explains its policies, that is, whetherJapan is motivated by concerns for its relative influence, gains and ranking. In order to answer this question, this paper analyzes Japan's policies in three periods: (1) 1962-1972, (2) 1972-1986, and (3) since 1986, following a brief introduction to the ADB. Power analysis explains Japan's strategies towards the ADB in the period from 1962-72. But it does not provide adequate explanations forJapan's actions from 1972-86. Japan adopted a more passive stance and received fewer tangible gains despite its greater financial power and its significant institutional advantages. Power analysis gives some answers for Japan's increasing assertiveness since 1986, but does not account for Japan's decreasing interest in tangible economic gains. My main argument is that Japan's puzzling behavior can be explained by institutionalist arguments. A close connection between the ADB and the Japanese Ministry of Finance has not only offered the Japanese officials dealing with the ADB options for influencing bank policies from behind the scenes but also made them identify with the ADB. This paper offers a view ofJapan that is contrary to conventional wisdom ofJapanese foreign policy, which portraysJapan as shirking international responsibilities and interested only in economic gains. It shows that
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have