Abstract
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and most other multilateral development banks (MDBs) have not provided significant direct assistance to Myanmar (Burma) since the mid-1980s, largely as a result of Western disapprobation over its military-dominated government.1 While the agenda prominently promoted by the ADB through its funding of programmes and projects across the Asia-Pacific as a whole can be considered part of an emerging “regulatory regionalism”, the regionalisation of economic governance through internal transformation of the state (Jayasuriya 2009; Hameiri and Jayasuriya 2011), its role in Myanmar has been strictly limited. Nonetheless, through its Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)2 programme, the ADB has provided some indirect technical assistance for projects based in Myanmar but, due to broader Western isolation policies, this has been allocated to NGOs, consultants and intermediaries rather than government agencies. The contributions have also been small compared with the direct assistance proffered to other non-democratic GMS states such as Laos and Vietnam, indicating the strong political influence within the organisation wielded by its major donors.3 Importantly, however, much of the indirect assistance that does flow from the ADB relates to proposed “economic corridors” including the East—West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), GMS “Flagship Initiatives” that have the stated aims of facilitating trade and investment and reducing poverty across Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (Asian Development Bank 2010b, 2010c).
Published Version
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