Abstract
Anti-individualism appears to preclude the possibility of direct, unproblematic knowledge of the contents of one's own intentional mental states. Gary Ebbs argues that such scepticism about the compatibility of anti-individualism and self-knowledge is incoherent. (See Ebbs 1996, section 6, entitled 'Why skepticism about self-knowledge is incoherent') I think that his argument is unsuccessful. Here is Ebbs's presentation of the self-knowledge sceptic's reasoning:
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