Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War

Abstract

THE RECENT American presidential campaign has had the per verse effect of postponing any serious national debate on the future U.S. course in Iraq. Electoral considerations placed a premium on consistency at the expense of common sense, with both candidates insisting that even with perfect hindsight they would have acted just as they did two years ago: going to war or voting to authorize doing so. The campaign also revealed the paucity of good options now before the United States. Keeping U.S. troops in Iraq will only provoke fiercer and more widespread resistance, but withdrawing them too soon could spark a civil war. The second administration of George W. Bush seems to be left with the choice between making things worse slowly or quickly. The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that the ongoing war in Iraq is not one that the United States can win. As a result of its initial miscalculations, misdirected planning, and inadequate pre paration, Washington has lost the Iraqi people's confidence and consent, and it is unlikely to win them back. Every day that Amer icans shell Iraqi cities they lose ftirther ground on the central front of Iraqi opinion. The war can still be won-but only by moderate Iraqis and only if they concentrate their efforts on gaining the cooperation of neighboring