Abstract
The concept of ‘dialogue’ can have radically different meanings to different people (Cf Muller 1991; Doeser 1983; Handgraaf 1983; Vroom 1983; Tracy 1981, 1987, 1989). But it can also serve as an umbrella-description for major questions. In this article the ambiguity of ‘dialogue’ is traced with reference to four well-known positions on dialogue: Gadamer (Trusting dialogue in goodwill …), Derrida (Suspicious dialogue in counter-position …), Rorty (Dialogue as therapy that changes our vocabulary …), and Haberman (Non-coercive dialogue according to rational procedures …). Some tentative conclusions on different approaches to dialogue are drawn and reflections on the relevance for scholars and for South African (theological; religious; political; scholarly; ethical, etc) discourse are presented.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
