Abstract
In this introductory chapter, Abbott highlights the commonalities between the relational sociology critiques of dualistic and static thinking in social theory on the one hand, and the recent philosophic critiques of the problematic reliance of Enlightenment moral thought on universalism, rationalism, and the disembedded subject on the other. This, Abbott argues, indicates the necessity of a relational sociology of morality. Specifically, the work of the likes of MacIntyre, Gilligan, and Dreyfus, along with a resurgent body of research conducted within the ‘new’ sociology of morality, point towards viewing morality in terms of practice, including everyday practice, and thus calls for a relational sociology of morality in practice.
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