From Holism and Individualism to a Relational Perspective on the Sociology of Morality

Abstract

This chapter outlines the necessity of a sociological view of morality. However, it is then argued that the traditional dualistic tendencies towards holism and individualism, which have plagued social theory more generally, have often likewise played themselves out in sociological conceptualisations of morality. The problems of such dualistic approaches to morality are detailed via a critique of Durkheim’s holist approach and Zygmunt Bauman’s individualist conception of morality. Indeed, the critiques of moral theories of Durkheim and Bauman are among the most extensive and rigorous available in the contemporary literature. The chapter concludes that the capacity of relational sociology to undermine traditional dualistic distinctions allows it to guide sociological conceptions of morality in a way that avoid the pitfalls associated with either holist or individualist approaches.