Interest Groups in American Public Law

Abstract

The bicentennial of the Constitution is approaching in a time of considerable dissatisfaction with the American scheme of governance. The dissatisfaction takes various forms, but many of the concerns have a common root in the problems produced by the existence of interest groups, or factions, and their influence over the political process. The scheme is challenged on the grounds that it allows powerful private organizations to block necessary government action;1 that the lawmaking process has been transformed into a series of accommodations among competing elites;2 and that the rise of a large bureaucracy exercising broad discretionary power has undermined original constitutional goals by circumventing the safeguards of separation of powers and electoral accountability.3 The problem of faction has been a central concern of constitutional law and theory since the time of the American Revolution. Madison made control of factions the centerpiece of his defense of the proposed Constitution. His antifederalist opponents objected on the ground that his solution was a false one, addressing only a symptom of the underlying problem. This de-