EINIGE BEMERKUNGEN ZUR THEORIE DES EINFLUSSES DER VERBÄNDE AUF DIE POLITISCHE WILLENSBILDUNG IN DER DEMOKRATIE*

Abstract

SUMMARY The traditional theory of the influence of interest groups on the political process asserts that interest groups will always be formed as soon as there arc a number of people with similar interests. As a consequence all the different ends of the population will be represented in the struggle among these groups, which will, therefore, bring about a fair outcome for all parts of the population. More recently Olson has shown that this theory is wrong because in many cases interest groups will not come into existence even if there are strong latent interests. More important perhaps is Wagner's argument that even without the existence of an interest group the wishes of the respective number of people will be represented in the political process because political parties want to win votes. This argument shows the necessity of demonstrating that the existence of interest groups brings about a more successful representation of the interests in question, if one wants to prove their influence on the political process. Reasons for this influence are the favourable position of interest groups and (or) their members in the information network of society and monopolistic market positions. Both enable them to influence additional voters besides members (and non-members with similar ends) in their voting behaviour. As a consequence the respective interests can be represented with better success among political parties vying for votes than without the existence of interest groups.