Abstract
Abstract Sosa emphasizes "firsthand intuitive insight" as a distinctive kind of epistemic aim and argues that this is a characteristic epistemic goal of humanistic inquiry. He draws from this some importantly antiskeptical conclusions for the epistemology of disagreement. I try to further develop this idea of insight, which I call ‘perceptio’, in which we "see" some truth to obtain. I agree that it is a distinctive epistemic good, although I think it is central to understanding in general and not just in the humanities. It is also central to a specific kind of knowing-that that does not involve understanding. The precise way in which perceptio is a distinctive epistemic good means that, although it cannot do the antiskeptical work for disagreement that Sosa probably wants, it can do some related work.
Published Version
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