Inconsistency in Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Abstract

Abstract Although Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) theory of conceptual metaphor has been extremely popular and successful, it has been criticized in many respects, one of which is its alleged inconsistency. This criticism presupposes that the principle of non-contradiction is the most important pillar of scientific theorizing because its violation turns the theory into logical chaos. Against this background, the paper asks: What kinds of inconsistencies emerge in conceptual metaphor theory and how should they be evaluated? In order to give an answer, the authors introduce Kertész and Rákosi’s (2019) [2012], (2022) p-model as a metatheoretical framework, with the help of which they analyse those arguments which charge conceptual metaphor theory with inconsistency. The authors conclude that if the dichotomy between inconsistency and consistency is replaced by the sophisticated distinctions among strong p-inconsistency, well-motivated permanent p-paraconsistency, temporary p-paraconsistency, and p-consistency, then the initial question can be answered in a straightforward manner.