In Dealing with A Hawkish Rival: Game Theoretic and Empirical Analyses of the Korean Peninsula Case

Abstract

Abstract This research uses game theoretic and event data analyses to come up with strategies for South Korea and the United States in dealing with the hawkish North Korea and examine impacts of the neighboring great-power behavior on the stability of the Korean peninsula. Findings suggest that South Korea and the United States should take a “middle position” in dealing with the hawkish North Korea and let North Korea know surely that they do so. Contrary to common belief, findings suggest that if the US follows the principle of reciprocity, a firm position towards Pyongyang helps promote its cooperative behavior toward Seoul. In addition, if the South Korean government maintains the principle of rendering sincere assistance to the North at its request, there is a greater possibility it will accept the South's proposal for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. By taking the middle position and letting North Korea know it, South Korea and the United States would produce a successful negotiation outcome even when they face the coming nuclear crisis in 2003. Regarding the growing Russian influence on North Korea's behavior, if a strong ROK-US relationship is a necessary condition for stability on the Korean peninsula, Seoul's efforts to improve its ties with Russia and China may well be sufficient preparation to induce North Korea's cooperative behavior toward South Korea.