Abstract

In comparison with the vast amount of theoretical contributions in the field of principal-agent theory, there exists a distinct scarcity of literature on the subject of how its principal findings can be applied in reality. In this context, the following article seeks to address a point of criticism often voiced in connection with principal-agent analysis, namely that its assumptions and results are far too restrictive to be of any use for the solution of real-world incentive problems. In contrast, we show how a particular type of incentive scheme developed by Osband, Reichelstein and others is currently used by the German Federal Railway to reduce agency problems with respect to planning and design services of outside architects and engineers for major construction projects. In addition, some of the problems encountered during the implementation stage of the project are discussed.

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