Illusion of nuclear superiority: an empirical study on the coercive value of nuclear superiority in a nuclear crisis

Abstract

ABSTRACT There has been a recent revival of the decades-long debates on the coercive value of nuclear superiority in a nuclear crisis. Some proponents of nuclear superiority assert that nuclear superiority grants coercive leverage for the superior side to prevail in political disputes vis-à-vis nuclear-armed adversaries. However, does nuclear superiority really provide meaningful coercive leverage during a nuclear crisis? This article empirically tests their claims against a recent case – the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis in 2017–2018. Through this, it argues that nuclear superiority has no meaningful compellent value beyond deterrence in a nuclear crisis for the two core reasons: first, a nuclear crisis does not follow the traditional balance of power logic; second, despite technological advancements, the viability of counterforce strategy in practice has yet to be attained.