Ibn Taymiyya's Criticism of the Syllogism

Abstract

Abstract The purpose of this study is to examine Ibn Taymiyya's criticism of Aristotelian logic, and to test the arguments he raises against it, as well as the theory he proposes as an alternative. Ibn Taymiyya tries to prove that Aristotelian logic cannot contribute to knowledge because it is based on metaphysical foundations. He raises arguments that are intended to expose the contradictions of Aristotelian logic. These arguments are based partly on the principles of relativity and skepticism, and partly on empirical presuppositions. Ibn Taymiyya proposed the use of analogical reasoning (qiyās al-tamthīl) which is a type of evaluation and measurement based on the comparison between particulars, or the relations between two similar or dissimilar things. It can be seen that the most important and decisive thing in this relation is the common attribute that links two particular occurrences. Therefore, this inference deals with the relations between things and the causal connections between them. This is expressed in the research method used in the Islamic juridical sciences, which are causal methods, such as: the coextensiveness and coexclusiveness (ṭard wa-῾aks), coextensiveness-cum-coexclusiveness (dawarān), and classification and successive elimination (al-sabr wa l-taqsīm).