Husserl\u2019s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters

Philipp Berghofer

doi:10.1007/s10743-018-9225-8

Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl’s conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 will be my main resources. My second aim is to demonstrate the currency and relevance of Husserl’s conception. This means two things: Firstly, I will show that in current debates in analytic epistemology there is a movement sharing with Husserl the basic idea that certain experiences gain their justificatory force simply from their distinctive phenomenal character. Secondly, I shall reveal the benefits of Husserl’s specific version of this view. Thus, one of my aims is to show that debates in current analytic epistemology could profit from adopting certain Husserlian elements. More precisely, I will defend Husserl’s claim that perceptual experiences are justifiers due to their self-giving phenomenal character as opposed to the currently popular view that it is the phenomenology of pushiness that makes them justifiers. To put it differently, what matters is what is originally given within experience and not how you feel about what is given.

Highlights

Husserl’s Notion of Intuition and Some Epistemological PrinciplesThanks to the works of phenomenologists such as Dan Zahavi, David Woodruff Smith, and John Drummond, Husserl’s phenomenology plays a considerable role in current philosophy of mind
Between phenomenology and current analytic epistemology, there is a great potential of rich and mutually beneficial synergies, which is why phenomenologists should engage in current debates
Non-psychological internalist conception of experiential justification: Whether or not an experience has justificatory force and how much justificatory force it has depends on internal factors, not including how strongly this experience pushes me towards believing a certain proposition

Summary

Husserl’s Notion of Intuition and Some Epistemological Principles

Thanks to the works of phenomenologists such as Dan Zahavi, David Woodruff Smith, and John Drummond, Husserl’s phenomenology plays a considerable role in current philosophy of mind. The passage of Ideas I that best encapsulates Husserl’s main epistemological principles with respect to intuition is the following one: Immediate ‘‘seeing’’, not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational assertions. Before I turn to the section to elaborate on P6 in more detail, I would like to discuss a possible objection to my claim that for Husserl it is originary intuitions that carry justificatory force In his sublime article, Walter Hopp has recently argued that it is not the intuitive acts but the fulfillments that justify our beliefs. Regress avoided (Ghijsen 2016, p. 37f.). Perception justifies but is not in need of justification (cf. Hua XXIV, p. 8 and Huemer 2001, p. 97).

Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification

Different Versions of PCEJ in Current Debates

Findings

Husserl’s Advantages