How to effectively prevent alienation behavior of prefabricated construction developers: an optimization analysis of regulatory strategies

Abstract

Prefabricated buildings (PBs) contribute to sustainable development, and their development largely depends on the active participation of developers. However, based on the characteristics of different stages of PBs' development and the goals of "14th Five-Year Plan" for architecture in China, it is an urgent practical problem for the government to encourage developers' active participation while regulating their alienation behavior. To address such problem, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to explore the government's reasonable regulatory strategies for developers' behavior in different development stages of PBs. Meanwhile, this paper explores the boundary of government's regulatory strength on PBs based on actual situation in China, which help the government to drive high-quality development of PBs with effective policy resources. Results reveal that the strict regulatory strategies have limited effects in the incubation stage of PBs. In the growth stage, it is necessary to adjust the regulatory strategies appropriately. The dynamic linear regulatory strategy can enable the PBs to achieve the phased goal, and the dynamic nonlinear regulatory strategy can help to achieve the optimal goal of PBs in China. In the maturity stage, the government does not need to deliberately regulate due to the considerable profits of developers. The regulatory strategy of "light reward and heavy punishment" is better when it is adopted to promote the development of PBs in the growth stage. The research also provides valuable suggestions for government regulators to formulate reasonable and dynamic regulatory policies for PBs.