How speckled is the hen?

Abstract

upon my epistemic circumstances would need to run as follows. 'North Korea is planning a surprise attack on rival countries also possessing nuclear arms. (This is (e)). Given (e), any rational person would believe that there will be a third world war. I am rational. So I believe that there will be a third world war.' But in this reflection, the second sentence is simply false. From the sheer truth of (e), nothing follows about what any rational person would believe. In order to draw an inference about what a rational person S would believe about war given the truth of (e), we would need some information about whether S believes (e). So it is crucial to the reflection that generates a justified belief that I believe that there will be a third world war that there is a premiss to the effect that I know, or at least believe, (e). But in order to ensure that a belief in such a premiss is available to me, we must assume a Shoemaker-style principle linking firstand second-order belief. Then we need not bring the concept of justification onto the scene at all in resolving our paradox.