How American Commercial Bail Developed Differently from Other Common Law Countries

Abstract

Outside the United States those countries sharing the common law tradition are pervasively hostile to commercialization of the bail process, whereas in the United States it is the typical approach. In some jurisdictions payment for bail is a crime; in others it is simply obstructed by various civil legal disabilities. How the American branch of the common law heritage came to deviate so strikingly from the rest on the matter of commercial bail is the topic of this article. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, courts principally in Ireland, England, and India began to act against payment to bail sureties on the concept that any indemnification of them—even partial—undermined their reliability. Irish courts took the approach that indemnified potential sureties were unreliable and should be rejected by courts. Where all potential sureties were indemnified, bail should be denied. In England courts declared agreements to indemnify sureties illegal contracts contrary to public policy, which would not be enforced by courts. While India took up the refinement of this position, England went on to declare agreements to pay bail sureties to be criminal conspiracies. Meanwhile in the United States a circumscribed version of the position that indemnification contracts were against public policy—and therefore illegal and unenforcible—actually gained acceptance between 1870 and 1912. In 1912, however, Justice Holmes in Leary v. U.S. renounced the common law concept of bail sureties in favor of an “impersonal and wholly pecuniary” view. This terminated the anti-indemnification movement. Courts soon noted the detrimental effects of commercialism on bail.