Abstract
ABSTRACT Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, Gulf Arab states have increasingly used foreign aid as an instrument of economic statecraft in the MENA region. By combining insights from both neoclassical realism and constructivism, we can better understand why Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have implemented a range of aid strategies to pursue different strategic and normative objectives during Tunisia’s political evolution. Qatar aimed to increase its regional influence and gain allies by supporting Islamist movements, while aid from the UAE and Saudi Arabia was used to promote authoritarian stability and counter the influence of political Islamist groups at both home and abroad. The analysis highlights the limitations and opportunities of economic statecraft, the intersection of material and ideational factors in its formation, and how the aid strategies employed by Arab states are similar to those of Western donors in terms of prioritising stability and security. Relatedly, it shows how Gulf countries take into consideration competing religious agendas and the influence of political Islam when allocating their aid.
Published Version
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