Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargaining at the Ad Hoc Tribunals

Abstract

This article explores the development of guilty pleas and plea bargaining at the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and proposes improvements to such practices. Originally, little attention was paid to guilty pleas and plea bargaining when the ad hoc tribunals were established. Both pleas and plea bargaining were seen by many as unlikely and, in any case, antithetical to their mandates. Soon, however, they acquired more prominence in the practice of the two tribunals, both adopting a model for guilty pleas that closely mirrors existing common law systems. While this led to significant efficiency gains for the tribunals, in some ways it has also undermined their truth-seeking function and efforts to provide justice for victimized individuals and communities. This article examines approaches to the issue adopted in civil law jurisdictions and their potential to mitigate some of the drawbacks of the guilty plea and plea bargaining model developed at the ad hoc tribunals.