Guest Editor's Note: Perspectives on the Arab Uprisings

Abstract

This special issue of Arab Studies Quarterly has its origins in the 10th Conference of the International Center of Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies, held at Eastern Mediterranean University, December 12-14, 2011. Many of the articles published were selected from the conference proceedings, and revised and updated for inclusion in this issue.The wave of protests that overtook the Middle East beginning in late 2010 were both and celebrated. They were shocking in the sense that the Middle East, owing to its geostrategic placement and relationship vis-a-vis the major powers, has long been a byword for dictatorship. While the underlying corruption and misrule of the Arab state system was widely noted by area scholars and government analysts, the speed of the unraveling left many experts unprepared.1 Over the course of 201 1, anti-government protestors forced the exile of Ben Ali of Tunisia, the resignation and later conviction of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to resign his Presidential office (while remaining influential as head of the General People's Congress, Yemen's ruling political party). In a different context, armed opponents of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, with the substantial aid of a NATO bombing campaign, captured and killed the long-time President and initiated a political transition thereafter.The speed of political developments through 2011, and the self-sacrifice and youthfulness of the movement - embodied in the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and the gathering of protesters in Egypt's Tahrir Square - inspired much international excitement, as to many observers, the decrepit political order of the region appeared to have passed, giving rise to a new spirit of democracy and human rights. And indeed, the mere success of the political revolts in forcing the end of multiple stable dictatorships broke the regional psychology of fear, suggesting that an alternative was in fact possible.Yet, as momentous as developments in the Arab world have been, prospects have subsequently dimmed, with fearful specters taking form: militarized sectarianism; counter-revolution; and the ongoing machinations of the great powers and its regional clients (chiefly, Saudi Arabia). In Syria, these forces have coalesced in terrible fashion, as the country has been plunged into outright civil war, with deaths in the tens of thousands (in early 20 1 3, the UN General Assembly President estimated that over 80,000 had been killed).2 Moreover, the politicized and militarized sectarianism that was earlier presaged by the terrible violence in neighboring Iraq, now colors the struggle in Syria, the Alawi-dominated government facing an opposition that has been increasingly associated with a Sunni Islamist orientation.3 The FSA's attempt to present itself as a non-confessional nationalist resistance saw it appoint George Sabra, a Christian social-democrat, as its President,4 before replacing him days later with a former imam from the Umayyad mosque of Damascus.5 Since the onset of the civil war, reports of explicitly sectarian violence against Alawites6 and Christians7 (the religious minorities generally allied with the regime for reasons of desperate survival) have been frequent.The sectarian nature of the conflict in Syria has amplified with the of the conflict, with Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah allied with the Syrian government,8 and the Sunni monarchical regimes allied with the opposition (including suggestions of arms transfers).9 Likewise, (nominally) non-state actors including Islamist militiafighters from neighboring Iraq, both Sunni and Shi'i - battle hardened from the sectarian battles in Iraq - have been reported crossing the border in Syria to join the battle on their respective sides.10 Ultimately, this regionalization of the struggle has had the effect of amplifying sectarian tension both within Syria as well as across the region generally, reinforcing the fears of Sunni regimes of Iranian regional influence. …