Greece and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis: Perceptions, Analysis and Politics

Abstract

Greece’s exposed strategic position in the Balkans and its strained relations with its Western allies due to the Cyprus dispute make this country an interesting case study of small states position in the Cold War. This article discusses the motives and perceptions that shaped the country’s stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in view of the Hungarian crisis and examines how it dealt with the dangers and opportunities that emerged. Motivated by pragmatism and a will to adopt a more ‘independent’ stance in foreign affairs, the Greek policymakers tried to reshape relations with the Soviets, but the historical experience and the perceived Soviet internal and external threat had already set the limits. Additionally, they attempted to take advantage of the twin crises in order to promote the Greek cause in Cyprus, but the country was subject to ‘multiple dependencies’ and faced dilemmas that stemmed from the conflict between national and Atlantic priorities. Cold War considerations were also important. The country’s inability to understand and respond to international pressures was partially counterbalanced by its participation in the Western Alliance. However, the most lasting consequence of the crisis for Greece was on the regional level. The Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement aimed at redressing the unfavourable strategic balance in the Balkans and ameliorate Greece’s perennial security problem.