Abstract

This article re-examines the capability–expectations gap in the European Union’s foreign policy in light of recent developments in this field. Our point of departure is the observation that the expectations being placed on the EU’s foreign and security capabilities in recent years have been steadily increasing, in response to a number of external and internal developments, including the Arab Spring, the Ukraine crisis and America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia, as well as the Brexit vote. We argue, however, that the institutional changes introduced as a result have not succeeded in fulfilling the lofty ambitions held of the Union either by itself or by other actors since they suffer from many of the same failings that have persistently bedevilled EU security initiatives. The result is a mismatch between the EU’s ambitions and its ability to deliver on these, which threatens to reopen the capabilities–expectations gap, which has been steadily declining since the late 1990s. Existing scholarly approaches have missed this problematic dynamic since they have focused more on the institutional changes (the supply side) rather than the increasing expectations (the demand side). While pronouncements regarding Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ and such like offer clear gains for European leaders in the short term, they may come back to haunt them in the years to come.

Highlights

  • In this article we re-examine the extent of the capabilities–expectations gap1 in light of recent developments in EU security and defence policy

  • We examine the comprehensive programme of discursive and institutional renewal from 2016 onwards, during which time a number of initiatives were launched, including the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the European Defence Fund (EDF), Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and Macron’s EI2, noting some of the practical limitations of these initiatives

  • The Brexit vote in June 2016 contributed to the momentum in EU security and defence policy that has been developing since 201351 and which had become especially visible with the preparation of the EUGS.52

Read more

Summary

Introduction

In this article we re-examine the extent of the capabilities–expectations gap in light of recent developments in EU security and defence policy. The most significant of these include the release of the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS), the establishment of a permanent military headquarters for missions and operations (MPCC), the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the creation of a European Defence Fund (EDF), the initiation of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and the proposal by Emmanuel Macron to establish a European Intervention Initiative (EI2).2 These reforms are all part of the EU’s ‘Brexit moment’ insofar as they have been created partially as a response to British withdrawal (as was the case with EI2), heavily shaped by the prospect of Brexit (the EUGS), or established owing to the removal of the British veto (including over the MPCC and the EDF). We argue that policymakers need to be cautious in their pronouncements if the EU is to remain a credible foreign and security actor in the longer term, and that scholars should pay greater attention to the demand side of the capabilities–expectations equation and remain open to the conceptual possibility that the gap may widen as well as narrow in the future

The capabilities–expectations gap in European foreign affairs
Great expectations
The EU in an insecure world
The Brexit moment
Changing institutions and expectations
Mind the gap
Resources
Interests
Decision-making
The Brexit effect
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call