Are EU restrictive measures really targeted, temporary and preventive? The case of Belarus

The EU sanctions have targeted Russian energy industry since 2014. Since February 2022, the European Union has imposed a series of unprecedented restrictions affecting Russian fuel trade, a highly sensitive area for both sides, each having a pragmatic interest hereinunder. Energy price cap established in 2022 became the climax of the EU’ sanctions policy against the Russian fuel and energy complex, making it one of the toughest measures in the history of the EU’s anti-Russian energy restrictions. In order to adapt to the new realities, the export directions of the Russian oil industry were reoriented from Europe to Asia. A number of domestic and foreign researchers have focused on the EU’ sanctions policy against the Russian fuel and energy industry, assessing its impact on the global energy market. At the same time, some issues remain insufficiently studied, including the effectiveness of the Russian adaptation strategy, as well as the impact of this strategy on Russia’s key trading partners. The purpose of this study is to identify the impact of the EU’ sanctions against the Russian fuel and energy complex on energy trade between Russia and its main counterparts; to reflect the current trends in Russia’s energy trade relations with China, India and Turkey; to assess the effectiveness of Russia’s strategy tailored to adapt to the EU’ restrictions in this area; and to evaluate the effectiveness of this strategy. The research shows that in the short term, the domestic oil industry has managed to promptly respond to the challenges that arose, which was possible due to significant discounts provided to the new partners. While Russian economy was trying to adapt to the current conditions in the global energy market, using the aforementioned strategy, key beneficiaries of the EU’ sanctions policy were clearly identified, including India, China and Turkey.

The increased sanctions efforts of European diplomacy in recent years have formed a new angle of view on the European Unionʼs external policy towards neighboring countries, since one of the criteria of the EUʼs sanctions policy effectiveness is the so-called “regional leadership” – third countriesʼ alignment with the EU sanctions regimes. The established academicdiscourse on the topic in Europe evaluates the effectiveness of the sanctions policy on this parameter extremely highly. However, what, in fact, is behind the facade of the postulated successes of regional leadership? In this paper, the author asks this question in relation to Iceland, a country that has increased vulnerability in the face of external challenges and which has incurred incomparably high costs from harmonizing its foreign policy with the EU anti-Russian sanctions regimes. Using the theoretical and methodological frameworks of the shelter theory, this study documents the negative political and economic consequences that Iceland has faced and shows that there are no such categories as consideration and leveling of possible costs for affiliated countries in the goal setting of the EU sanctions policy. In the Icelandic case, this, in turn, leadsto a reformatting and polarization of the existing ecosystem of relations in the Euro-Atlantic, since the costs Iceland incurs from harmonization with EU policy are mostly compensated by the United States, although traditionally the U.S. has been responsible for Icelandʼs military rather than economic protection. The international political situation in the conditions of sanctions sets the stage for possible tensions in Icelandʼs relations with the EU and a stronger U.S. direction in its multilateral foreign policy. Nevertheless, despite these tensions, Iceland will continue to synchronize with the EU sanctions regimes, as other options are either fraught with even greater costs (synchronization with the U.S. sanctions policy, which is substantially tougher than that of the EU) or unrealizable in the international realities after the start of the Special Military Operation(developing its own sanctions regime).

The article presents a comprehensive study of the process of synchronizing Ukraine’s sanctions policy with the European Union’s legal mechanisms. In the context of the Russian Federation’s armed aggression and Ukraine’s strategic course toward European integration, the issue of harmonizing restrictive measures with the EU sanctions regime has gained particular relevance. The authors analyze the legal basis for Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign and security policy, particularly the provisions of the Association Agreement that establish the framework for coordinating sanction approaches. The article examines key stages in the adaptation of Ukrainian sanctions legislation, particularly the Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions,” the decision-making practices of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Ukraine’s involvement in the development of sanctions lists aligned with European counterparts. The focus is on examples of effective synchronization of Ukrainian restrictive measures with EU sanctions, especially with respect to individuals promoting the Russian Federation’s aggressive policies. At the same time, the article highlights that Ukraine retains autonomy in decision-making by conducting its own assessment of the appropriateness of sanctions. Special attention is given to prospects for improving the legal mechanism for sanctions implementation, including proposals for the adoption of a special law that would enable the simplified transposition of EU sanctions, provided they comply with national interests and legal standards. The article outlines current trends in the development of Ukraine’s sanctions legislation, including the introduction of criminal liability for the deliberate circumvention of sanctions, legislative amendments to combat the re-export of prohibited goods, and Ukraine’s integration into the European sanctions control framework. It also analyzes the impact of recent EU initiatives—particularly the anti-circumvention instrument—on shaping Ukraine’s corresponding policy. The importance of strengthening cooperation within the framework of the Ukraine–EU Joint Security Commitments and Ukraine’s potential participation in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy sanctions-making process is emphasized. As a result of the study, the authors conclude that effective synchronization of sanctions policy with the European Union is not only a means of strengthening national security, but also an important element of Ukraine’s legal integration into the EU. Current legislative initiatives, backed by political will and international coordination, are forming the basis for a coherent and effective sanctions policy capable of addressing the challenges of today’s geopolitical landscape and reinforcing Ukraine’s position as a full-fledged participant in the European security system.

Sanctions are one of the most important approaches to resolving international conflicts, influencing regime change in a country and promoting democracy, peace and stability in the region. They are used as an alternative to the use of military force. The European Union, as one of the leading international organisations and actors in ensuring regional and international security, has been applying this practice for more than 70 years to overcome aggressive anti-lawful actions of countries that violate international law. This article focuses on the EU’s sanctions policy against Belarus in 2004-2024. The European Union’s sanctions policy towards Belarus was implemented in two stages. At the first stage, the EU imposed sanctions on this country because of human rights violations, constant persecution of opposition members, and massive fraud during the presidential election, and the brutal suppression of peaceful protests. The second stage included EU sanctions against Belarus for its support and assistance to Russia in the war against Ukraine, especially in the issue of Russia’s circumvention of European sanctions. Between March 2022 and February 2024, a number of both personal and economic restrictive measures were introduced. Despite this, the EU’s sanctions policy towards Belarus has not been very effective. In the case of Belarus, EU sanctions were more “like moral sermons, signals of moral superiority”, which primarily affect the European Union itself financially. Therefore, in April 2024, the EU agreed to strengthen sanctions against Belarus. Today, we can only hope that the strengthening of the EU’s sanctions policy against Belarus will have a serious impact on both the economy and the overall development of the aggressor country, thereby forcing it to comply with international law.

Brexit has brought uncertainties concerning the alignment of EU and UK sanctions policies. While both sides are clearly committed towards further cooperation in this area, the question is how this may materialise in practice. This contribution addresses this question from the alignment experience of other third countries. Based upon a legal and statistical analysis of existing models and taking into account relevant UK and EU policy documents and political declarations, the chapter establishes different scenarios for future cooperation in the field of sanctions. It is argued that, in contrast to the experience of other neighbouring countries, cooperation between the EU and the UK will most likely be a more open format for consultation and cooperation rather than a one-way alignment with the EU’s sanctions regimes.

With some 40 different types of restrictive measures in force, the European Union is undisputedly one of the major protagonists of today’s sanction regimes. Measures such as selective trade embargos, asset freezes and travel bans have been adopted by the EU not only to implement Security Council mandated sanctions, but also in addition to (as with Iran and North Korea) or in the absence of UN action (as with Syria and Russia). Further, EU recent practice evidences that sanctions (Myanmar and Zimbabwe) have served the EU and its member states’ own interests also with the view to promoting (the European construction of) values generally shared in international society. After outlining the legal discipline and the policy framework of EU restrictive measures, the present article analyses the legal issues emerging with respect to EU sanctions over the last four years. Among these, the 2017 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU in Rosneft, Brexit and its consequences on the implementation/adoption of sanctions by the United Kingdom, and recent developments concerning the legal position of candidate countries which refused to align with the EU sanction adopted in reaction to the Ukraine crisis, are the most important.

Purpose – This paper aims to analyse sanctions regimes of multilateral development banks and to examine some of the topical issues surrounding sanctioning practices of these institutions. Under the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (the “Mutual Enforcement Agreement”), sanctions covering the sanctionable practices that are imposed and made publicly available by any participating MDB may be enforced by other participating MDBs. This dramatically amplifies the impact of debarment decisions taken by any one of the participating MDBs, while affirming the MDBs’ commitment to combating the sanctionable practices. Consequently, companies will need to invigorate their procedures with a view to managing their risks not only in relation to national legislation, but also in relation to the MDBs’ sanctioning frameworks, which have much broader geographic scope than that of national legislation. This paper first provides an overview of the tenets established by the Mutual Enforcement Agreement. Further, as all MDBs maintain their own sanctions mechanisms, the paper analyses individual sanctions regimes of the WBG, EBRD and ADB. The paper then describes the types of sanctions that may be imposed by MDBs and examines some of the challenging issues surrounding the banks’ sanctions practices. Design/methodology/approach – This paper draws on the experience of senior lawyers who were intimately involved in the set-up of the sanctions regimes at the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the EBRD and the ADB and are currently involved in the work of sanctions boards at their respective institutions. Findings – Companies and individuals dealing with MDBs should be aware of the fact that, as a result of the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, the profile of MDBs’ fraud and corruption cases has been raised significantly and could result in global sanctions for prohibited practices in a single country. Consequently, a company engaging in a prohibited practice in its business dealings with one MDB might find itself unable to obtain financing from the four other MDBs participating in the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, and furthermore its debarment would be published by all five participating MDBs (subject to the above-described limitations of ADB’s publication regime). As MDBs continue to develop their sanctions regimes, greater harmonisation among sanctions processes is to be expected and companies doing business with MDBs should, at the very minimum, ensure that their compliance and ethics programmes are up to date, both as a preventative measure or, if wrongful actions have already taken place, as a means of mitigating the severity of possible sanctions. Originality/value – A lot has been written about the consequences of criminal convictions for bribery and other corrupt practices. However, much less attention has been paid to the evolution of anti-corruption policies and procedures which have been developed by a group of leading MDBs. In fact, for many corporates, sanctions regimes of MDBs remain unchartered territory, even though these sanctions proceedings can have far-reaching business consequences. This paper will, therefore, be of interest to all companies directly or indirectly involved with MDB-financed projects, as they need to be alert to the scope of MDB sanctions proceedings and the wide-ranging adverse business consequences that may result from any enforcement action.

A fractious UN Security Council has contributed to the decline in effectiveness of a number of UN sanctions adopted in recent years. Yet they remain a tool of the Council, for example with regard to Libya in 2011. The challenge is to understand how UN, country (US) and regional sanctions (EU, AU, Arab League) can be meaningful in such a climate. The four books reviewed make various suggestions, from clarity of mandate to better evaluating impact. Mikael Eriksson's Targeting peace seeks to evaluate the complexity of the sanctions policy process. He argues that effectiveness comes partly from understanding politics (episodes of sanctions), but also from institutional reform—‘black box’ processes, as he calls them. Sanctions are more successful as part of a wider package. Clara Portela in European Union sanctions and foreign policy examines the use of sanctions as a political tool, including the suspension of development aid and the withdrawal of trade privileges. She shows how the EU plays an important role in signalling and constraining when UN sanctions are weak. For example, informal measures like the 2003 EU decision to invite only dissidents to national day receptions in Havanna resulted in the release of detainees that it had aimed for. The high rate of success of development aid cut-off stands in sharp contrast with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy sanctions. The unintended consequence of good intentions is also highlighted by both Portela and Eriksson—Zimbabwe in particular but also Cote d'Ivoire and Iran pose similar challenges. The imposition of EU or UN sanctions is easier than reaching consensus to lift them, although events in Burma (Myanmar) in 2012 have resulted in smooth suspensions of most US and EU sanctions. All four books show that targeted sanctions cannot be seen as stand-alone measures, nor assessed in isolation. Sanctions are multi-faceted and require detailed assessment of political context, episode and institutional process.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the European Union’s sanctions policy in the field of human rights protection, focusing on its fundamental transformation from predominantly declarative and fragmented measures to an institutionalized, systemic global sanctions regime. The central subject of the research is Regulation (EU) 2020/1998, which established this new mechanism. The study employs institutional analysis, comparative legal methodology, and a systemic approach. The legal nature of this regime is examined in detail, including its universal character that allows for the application of restrictive measures irrespective of the perpetrator’s geographical location. The institutional architecture is analyzed, encompassing the roles of key EU institutions (the Council of the EU, the European External Action Service, the European Commission) and Member States in the process of initiating, adopting, and implementing sanctions. The criteria for applying restrictive measures are disclosed, particularly concerning the severity and systemic nature of human rights violations, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. A comparative analysis of the EU’s global sanctions regime with the American Magnitsky Act is conducted, identifying common features and significant differences, especially in the degree of centralization in decision-making and implementation approaches. Particular attention is paid to the European Union’s response to the full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which has demonstrated both the potential and certain limitations of the existing sanctions policy, acting as a catalyst for its further strengthening. Key challenges to the effectiveness of the EU’s sanctions mechanism are identified and analyzed. These include the significant decentralization of the sanctions implementation process at the national level by Member States, which can lead to uneven application and the creation of «weak links.» Problems related to complex schemes for circumventing imposed restrictions and insufficient coordination are also considered. The urgent need for the unification of implementation and control procedures, as well as for the clear definition of specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) objectives for each sanctions regime and individual decision, is substantiated. Based on the conducted research, evidence-based proposals for improving the EU’s sanctions policy are formulated. These proposals include strengthening coordination, expanding analytical capabilities for detecting circumvention schemes, and enhancing monitoring. It is emphasized that studying the EU’s experience in this area is highly relevant for Ukraine in the process of developing and harmonizing its own effective sanctions strategy in accordance with international standards.

EU sanctions against Russia are unprecedented in their breadth, as well as in the seriousness of the wrongdoing they seek to address. As a result, the EU finds itself in uncharted waters as it develops its sanctions policy vis-à-vis Russia. This paper offers an overview of three strategic issues that are likely to impact the further evolution of EU policy in this area, namely: the objectives that EU sanctions against Russia can pursue; the fate of hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of Russian assets reportedly frozen across EU Member States; and the possible humanitarian impact of sanctions on Russian population. While questions associated with each of these issues admit of no easy answers, thinking through them will be essential to shaping a coherent, credible and effective sanctions policy in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

The implementation of the United Nations council sanctions by member states has gained increasing importance in the sanctions debate over the past 15 years. Having remained long neglected in academic circles, the sanctions review process sponsored by the Swiss, German, and Swedish governments over the past decade has been instrumental in putting the question of implementation at the centre of the sanctions research agenda.1 One of the main innovations that has characterized the sanctions landscape in the aftermath of the Cold War is the transformation of sanctions instruments: the classical trade embargoes that dominated the sanctions scene for most of the 20th century have given way to more sophisticated and carefully crafted measures. The establishment of targeted sanctions has been accompanied by other novel developments, such as the practice of targeting individuals rather than These transformations make it necessary to explore how the national implementation of multilateral sanctions has been affected, as well as its consequences for the efficacy of the measures.This article sketches the main issues surrounding the national implementation of United Nations sanctions. It identifies the most salient trends in the implementation of sanctions by individual states - and regional entity, namely the European Union - and outlines how they have been affected by the emergence of targeted, often blacklist-based sanctions. At the same time, the analysis endeavours to focus on the impact that new developments have on the efficacy of the measures concerned.The article is divided into four sections. The first provides brief introduction to the transformations in sanctions as tool over the past two decades. A second section outlines conflicting trends working both in favour and to the detriment of sanctions implementation. The third reviews the problems caused by the increasing encroachment on domestic legal orders by recent sanctions regimes. A final section discusses the difficulties posed by the violation of standards of due process resulting from UN blacklists, which merits special attention as it is the source of number of legal cases in Europe.THE UN SANCTIONS LANDSCAPE AND ITS POST-COLD WAR MUTATIONSThe use of sanctions by the UN council increased significantly in the aftermath of the Cold War. While the council subjected only two countries to mandatory sanctions prior to 1989 (Rhodesia and South Africa), Carina Staibano has counted 20 voluntary and mandatory sanctions regimes that were active between 1964 and 2005.2 As of the end of November 2009, there were 11 active sanctions regimes. UN sanctions practice has undergone series of transformations at different levels. For the purpose of our analysis, the innovations introduced in UN practice can be succinctly summarized as follows.In the early to mid-1990s, the UN council began to authorize sanctions to deal with internal armed conflict, especially in countries where state authority had collapsed, or so-called failed states. This was the case even in instances where internal conflict had limited external ramifications. From that point of view, the council departed from the restrictive interpretation of what constituted a threat to international peace and security that had characterized its practice since its inception. Apart from expanding the range of situations that qualified for enforcement action, the council also started to apply some of its sanctions regimes on only one of the parties in conflict, therefore manifestly taking sides. In range of internal conflict situations such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Angola, the sanctions targeted rebel groups. Similarly, the goals of sanctions regimes expanded to cover gross human rights violations, concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism, thus acquiring new roles in preserving peace and security. …

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in the EU sanctions policy. Understanding this transformation matters not only for sanctions scholars but also for appreciating how the EU navigates such crises. We study how internal institutional dynamics and external influences from third countries as well as lobbying by economic interests interact to shape the genesis of the EU’s sanctions regime against Russia. In the absence of a specific procedure in EU primary law, two processes have emerged: one for ordinary and one for exceptional, emergency situations, the latter only intended for Russian sanctions. The Commission has secured greater clout in the emergency process, which has strengthened the role of interest groups and third countries in decision-making. The emergency process is meant to be a temporary arrangement, but, since institutional development rarely regresses, at least some new elements are likely to persist in the post-war context.

EU restrictive measures (sanctions) have long been imposed on individuals like rulers and businesspersons close to rulers who have been committing acts that are contrary to international peace and security. Considering gathered evidence on a sufficiently solid factual basis, and the duty to state reasons, such sanctioning is an accepted form of action that the EU takes, accounting for the provisions of the EU Treaties and adopted secondary law. As the EU sanctions regime has become increasingly sophisticated, the EU has begun to also impose sanctions on the family members of otherwise sanctioned persons, to ensure that EU sanctions are not easily circumvented. This article considers the lawfulness of the EU’s imposition of sanctions on family members of otherwise sanctioned persons, accounting for any potential links or associations that family members may have beyond that of being a mere relative. Whilst the EU extends the reach of its sanctions regime, it must take into account the position in society that the otherwise sanctioned person holds – whether they are members of a governing regime of a third state as a ruler, or whether they are prominent businesspersons who benefit economically from the third state – to determine the lawfulness of also imposing sanctions on their family members. Ultimately, both the Council as the decision-maker, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as the judicial reviewer, will have to balance the interests at stake, until an agreed upon standard can be established, with the result that the threshold for sanctions on the relatives of businesspersons and of relatives is consistent. Restrictive measures, Sanctions, Rules, Relatives, Businesspersons, Governing regime, Family, Family members, Judicial review, Court of Justice of the European Union, Court of Justice, General Court, Common Foreign and Security Policy

With some 40 different types of restrictive measures in force, the European Union is undisputedly one of the major protagonists of today’s sanction regimes. Measures such as selective trade embargos, asset freezes and travel bans have been adopted by the EU not only to implement Security Council mandated sanctions, but also in addition to (as with Iran and North Korea) or in the absence of UN action (as with Syria and Russia). Further, EU recent practice evidences that sanctions (Myanmar and Zimbabwe) have served the EU and its member states’ own interests also with the view to promoting (the European construction of) values generally shared in international society. After outlining the legal discipline and the policy framework of EU restrictive measures, the present article analyses the legal issues emerging with respect to EU sanctions over the last four years. Among these, the 2017 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU in Rosneft, Brexit and its consequences on the implementation/adoption of sanctions by the United Kingdom, and recent developments concerning the legal position of candidate countries which refused to align with the EU sanction adopted in reaction to the Ukraine crisis, are the most important.

This paper emphasises the importance of sanctions policy and the role of different sanctions regimes triggered by various conflict zones today and in past decades. Based on examples of sanctions against Iraq, the Russian Federation and Venezuela, it highlights the difference between traditional embargo-style sanctions and recently introduced sectoral sanctions specifically targeting specific economic sectors. The paper also discusses coordination efforts between different sanctions regimes towards a global sanctions policy through the experience of the sanctions against the Russian Federation, as well as a new human rights sanctions regime. On the other hand, different political considerations can also lead to a clash of sanctions regimes. The paper discusses the impact of divergent international relations with Iran on sanctions when the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, reinstating secondary sanctions against Iran and causing legal and economic challenges for companies within the European Union (EU). Based on the recent preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU in the Bank Melli v Telekom Deutschland GmbH case, the paper points out the main considerations regarding the blocking statute activated by the EU in order to protect enterprises within the EU from the extraterritorial effect of foreign sanctions laws. In addition, the paper features the possible criminal as well as civil law liability for sanctions violations in different jurisdictions, highlighting some examples such as sanctions law offences by BNP Paribas. In the light of the possible penalties and financial losses caused for companies, the paper sets out a comprehensive decision matrix for experts and decision makers who want to evaluate whether another entity is sanctioned or has sanctioned ownership in a certain jurisdiction. Finally, it elaborates which technical add-on features a sanctions list screening software should possess in order to detect and manage sanctioned entities.