Getting Around Pyongyang's Hard-Liners

Abstract

In the standard U.S. image, North Korea is a monolithic, Stalin-style dictatorship controlled by one man, Kim Jong Il. However, the key reason for North Korean intransigence in the crisis with the United States is that Kim does not have unchallenged control over foreign and defense policy. The North Korean power structure is deeply divided between pragmatists who favor a deal with the United States and increasingly assertive hard-liners who argue that a tough posture is needed to stop the Bush administration from pursuing in Pyongyang.My most disturbing finding on a recent visit to North Korea was that a showdown over policy occurred in early February 2005 between the dealers, led by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, the principal foreign policy adviser to Kim, and a coalition of hard-line generals and Workers' Party leaders. The hardliners prevailed. On February i0, 2005, Pyongyang made its pronouncement that it has manufactured nukes and is a nuclear weapons state. Then a March 3i declaration served notice that North Korea will no longer discuss dismantling its weapons capabilities until the United States normalizes economic and diplomatic relations with the Kim regime.The ascendancy of the hard-liners is the direct result of the Bush administration's ideologically driven North Korean policy and can be reversed only if the United States makes a fresh start attuned to the conciliatory engagement approach now being pursued by South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun.In contrast to his father, the late Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il is not a revered, charismatic demigod and must accommodate pressures from his generals. As the son of the Great Leader, he is needed out in front to legitimize the regime, but the armed forces wield growing power, even in the economic sphere.In the February showdown, I was told by several of those involved, the argued in favor of preserving ambiguity concerning the extent of North Korean capabilities as part of a continued effort to get economic quid pro quos in return for step-by-step denuclearization.The hard-liners countered that it would be naive to continue hoping for a beneficial deal with the Bush administration, which in their view is seeking regime change and wants to use the six-party talks in Beijing to drive Pyongyang into a corner. It is demeaning for North Korea to let the United States keep it on the defensive in the six-party talks, they contended, even though Washington has 7,400 operational weapons of its own. The only self-respecting course for North Korea, they said, would be to rule out any discussion of dismantlement for now and to declare unambiguously that North Korea is already a nuclear weapons state in order to make Washington think twice about any military adventure.There is a strong mood of wounded pride and angry nationalism in Pyongyang that cuts across both dealers and hard-liners. It is particularly galling to North Korean leaders that the United States, oblivious to the sensitivity of Chinese-Korean relations throughout history, is attempting to apply pressure through China and to use it as a diplomatic intermediary.This is not the i9th century, one North Korean official commented, an allusion to the servile posture of Korean monarchs toward China during the closing decades of the Yi dynasty, which provoked a strong nationalist reaction. The Kim regime consistently appeals to Korean national pride and has sought friendship with the United States in part as an offset to excessive dependence on its giant neighbor. Thus, attempting to use China to pressure Pyongyang only strengthens the hardliners.It was a red flag to the hard-liners when Bush sent a White House emissary to Chinese President Hu Jintao on Feb. i with a letter calling for a much tougher posture against Pyongyang. To army generals who think of themselves as the guardians of Korean nationalism, it was necessary to show the world that North Korea would not submit to U. …