French Constitutional Law and Future Generations: Towards the implementation of transgenerational principles?

Journal Article Martin A. Rogoff, French Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials Get access Martin A. Rogoff, French Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials ( Carolina Academic Press, Comparative Law Series, 2010) Elisabeth Zoller Elisabeth Zoller Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 61, Issue 1, Winter 2013, Pages 209–214, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/61.1.209 Published: 01 January 2013

French Constitutional Law and Future Generations: Towards the implementation of transgenerational principles?

The chapter discusses the limits that constitutional law in France imposes in relation to international investment treaties. It takes the decision by the French Conseil constitutionnel on the compatibility of the investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms contained in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement concluded between Canada and the European Union with the French constitution as an example to illustrate one important aspect of the interplay between national constitutional law and international investment law, namely how constitutional courts control the constitutionality of investment treaties.

On 26 July 2017, the Conseil constitutionnel ruled upon the compatibility of an EU (mixed) agreement with the French Constitution. Its decision, which concerned the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), clarifies, from a national constitutional law perspective, the room of manoeuvre of the national judge when controlling EU acts which also happen to be acts of the Member States. The necessity to combine EU law with French constitutional law when monitoring this specific category of international commitments of the French Republic results in a very narrow margin of manoeuvre for the judge. In the end, the Conseil constitutionnel considers CETA to be compatible with the Constitution of the French Republic.

This article examines the legislation of foreign countries regarding mechanisms of direct democracy, particularly the institution of popular veto. A historical analysis of the development of this instrument in European law has been conducted. The methodological basis of the publication consists of scientific methods based on the requirements of objective and comprehensive analysis of socio-political and legal phenomena, which include direct democracy in foreign countries. The research methodology is founded on general theoretical principles and approaches to determining the initial parameters of the formation and development of popular veto as a form of direct democracy. To achieve scientific objectivity in the results, the author used a full range of general scientific and special research methods widely applied in the modern science of constitutional law. It has been established that although modern forms of direct democracy emerged relatively recently, the concept of popular veto has roots in ancient civilizations as a means of limiting the abuse of power. Initially, the right of veto was exercised not directly by citizens, but by authorized persons on behalf of the people, who could reject laws that contradicted fundamental norms. It is argued that although popular veto was first enshrined in French constitutional law, Switzerland is considered its birthplace, where this institution received genuine development and was first implemented in practice in 1831. The evolution of popular veto is closely linked to the development of Swiss statehood; however, the immediate impetus for its implementation was granting citizens direct voting rights and the right to participate in referendums. Initially, popular veto was applied at the level of individual cantons, and in 1874 it was enshrined in the Swiss Constitution at the national level. According to the constitutional procedure, a specified number of voters can officially express disagreement with an adopted law within a set period, after which it must be submitted to a nationwide referendum for approval or repeal.

The article examines how the concept of constitutional identity has evolved in German constitutional history since 1871, the year of entry into force of the first Germany-wide constitution. This article outlines the theoretical ideas and historical constellations framing the evolution of the notion of constitutional identity, and helps demystify the legal concept. It shows that during the period governed by the Constitution of the German Reich of 1871, the concept of constitutional identity was, in principle, unknown. It was only during the period of the Weimar Constitution, that the notion of constitutional identity was introduced. In 1928, the notion was used by the anti-democratic constitutional lawyers, Carl Schmitt and Carl Bilfinger, within their different theories of justifying the implicit (constitutional) limits on amendments to the Weimar Constitution. In the course of the drafting of the German Basic Law, there was no reference to the notion of constitutional identity. It was only after the German Basic Law had come into force that the notion (re-)emerged. It was used in some aspects of the legal doctrine in order to interpret article 79(3) of the German Basic Law in the light of the ideas of Carl Schmitt. More recently, it was adopted by the German Constitutional Court in order to justify constitutional limits on European integration. The article ends with an assessment of the development of the German concept of constitutional identity. For this purpose, the German doctrine is contrasted with French constitutional law.

This chapter describes the doctrine of equality, and how far it is a general principle of the Constitution. It specifically argues that the Conseil constitutionnel's notion of equality is quite limited. Rather than a value of general application, equality is mainly concerned with non-discrimination in relation to specific constitutional values. The concern of the Conseil in this chapter appears predominantly to be to ensure a rational relationship between the provisions of a loi and the constitutional or legislative objectives that they are intended to achieve. The meaning of equality will be assessed by dealing first with the specific areas designated by the constitutional texts on which the Conseil has been required to pronounce, and then by considering the wider application of equality before the law. The equality in French constitutional law is explained as well. The study of equality demonstrates the way in which the Conseil constitutionnel has been elaborating the Constitution. It has taken specific values from the constitutional texts, and required the legislator to respect them.

For a long time, French constitutional law did not appear to concern itself unduly with the European Communities and the process of European integration: the French Constitution did not contain any reference to the European Communities and the Conseil constitutionnel had little involvement with international treaties and their enforcement as a result of an early decision. However, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 triggered a process of deep constitutional change in France. Since then, the text of the French Constitution has been repeatedly amended to respond to the quickening pace of European integration. Furthermore, the Conseil constitutionnel has totally transformed its control of the constitutionality of international treaties. An assessment of these constitutional changes seems opportune at this juncture. More specifically, an investigation into the manner in which the French constitution reacted to the changing European Union helps cast some light on the impact of European integration on national constitutions.

French Constitutional Law

François Hotman (1524–1590) was one of the leading Reformed jurisconsults of his time. Past research has stressed his innovative interpretations and practices in the study of Roman, feudal, and French constitutional law. Little has yet been said about his views on canon law, another fundamental legal body in Western history that experienced renewed intellectual scrutiny during the sixteenth century. This paper investigates some of Hotman’s early work on canon law, focusing on his legal–historical reconstruction of the early Church in De statu primitivae Ecclesiae (1553) and his contribution to a budding historical field in Catholic circles: conciliar history. Despite the general lack of interest in the history of councils on the part of some leading Protestant theologians (Luther, Calvin, Bullinger), Hotman clearly believed that the textual tradition of councils provided a prime example of sustained popish efforts to control and deform the historical narrative and the legal structure of the Church. Yet, although he seems to have worked on demonstrating just that over more than forty years, he never again voiced his views on the matter in a dedicated work. Comparing in its conclusion De statu primitivae Ecclesiae with Antitribonian, this paper suggests that, in parallel to his better known ‘complex of Tribonian’ (Pierre Mesnard), Hotman seems to have suffered from a ‘complex of Gratian’: the doctrinal unity and institutional accomplishments of the early Church, as represented by the first councils, may well have dazzled Hotman and kept him from writing some definitive work against Gratian.

<p>This case note analyses the French Conseil constitutionnel's CETA decision of 31 July 2017 (ECLI:FR:CC:2017:2017.749.DC). The Conseil was the first national court to reach a substantive judgment on whether CETA was compatible with an EU Member State’s constitution, concluding that there was nothing in CETA that was at odds with French constitutional law. Given that CETA will also be subject to ex ante review at the European Court of Justice requested by Belgium, the Conseil constitutionnel’s decision is another milestone in the judicial saga surrounding CETA, but not the end of the road. The note argues that the Conseil employed a dynamic and cooperative interpretation of sovereignty and showed a strong attitude of deference both to France’s political branches and to the EU in terms of international treaty-making. There are, however, some aspects where the decision would have benefited from greater clarity. Nonetheless, instead of undermining France’s constitutional order, the Conseil confirmed the fundamental commitment of France to European integration and international cooperation. More particularly, it refrained from unduly interfering with the ability of the EU and its Member States to continue operating as a collective international actor.<br /></p>

The 1958 Constitution provided France with a constitutionally based system of justice and although this had been contrary to French traditions — and consequently apprehended at that time — the system has progressively developed and become one of the main elements of the French constitutional regime and at the same time, one of its most dynamic and appreciated components. This article presents the French Constitutional Council: its status, composition and operations. It maps out areas in which this body has had to intervene and, above all, it analyses the jurisprudence of the Council and notes that its most impressive contribution lies in the field of the constitutional review of laws and its main objective, basic personal freedoms. The conclusion of this study is that French constitutional law has undergone radical modifications under this system and that in the future, it has become a fertile ground for comparative studies for the Canadian jurist due to the constitutional review of laws in the name of personal freedoms.

The <i>Nicolo</i> Case of the <i>Conseil D’Etat</i>: French Constitutional Law and the Supreme Administrative Court’s Acceptance of the Primacy of Community Law Over, Subsequent Na

A preliminary reference on the part of the Constitutional Council was, in several respects, not to be expected. It was debatable whether it would consider itself as a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and, therefore, whether it would refer a case to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) at all. The French constitutional court could also have resorted to theacte clairdoctrine so as to escape from their obligation to ask for the interpretive guidance of the CJEU. However, the main reason why a reference was not awaited by legal actors lies in the limited jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council. Until the introduction in 2008 of the so-called QPC, that is,question prioritaire de constitutionnalité(the Priority Preliminary Reference mechanism on issues of constitutionality), theConseil constitutionnelhad a very limited jurisdiction compared to its European counterparts. Its main mission was to assess the conformity of parliamentary bills and treaties with the Constitution and only with the Constitution. Its review could only take placeex ante, between the adoption and the promulgation of a text. By opening the way to anex postreview of statutes with regard to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the QPC brought about a major change in the French adjudication system: statutes are no longer immune from constitutional challenge once they are in force. However, treaties and other international or European commitments are no parameters of constitutional review. TheConseil constitutionnelmade this clear in 1975 and never seriously changed track, despite minor qualifications to the rule. In their seminalIVGruling on the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, they held that it was not up to them to review the compatibility of bills with treaties, in spite of Article 55 of the Constitution. Consequently, the task of the constitutional judges does not go beyond the assessment of laws with regard to the Constitution. This is the main reason that explains why, on the face of it, theConseil constitutionnelwas unlikely to refer a case to the CJEU. Why would it seek the interpretation or ask for the review of a European text if this text is immaterial for it and if the yardstick of its examination is the Constitution and only the Constitution? Yet, it happened. For the first time, theConseilreferred a case to the CJEU on 4 April 2013. Although this is undoubtedly a major legal breakthrough, we will see in due course that this is probably more arévolution de palaisthan a true revolution in French constitutional law.

1958: a priori review of parliamentary legislation to keep Parliament within its limited legislative competences – 2008: a posteriori review to protect citizens' rights and freedoms – Varieties of concrete review – Originality of the new French procedure – An indirect constitutional complaint: raised by a litigating party, transmitted by an ordinary court and decided by the Constitutional Council – Obstacle to transmission: declaration of conformity in the motives of an earlier decision by Constitutional Council – Conceptual, logical and legal reasons for a strict distinction between normative content and justificatory discourse in judgments – Setting on par of motives and operative part transforms French legal system into a specific form of common law and weakens the Rule of Law