Forward-deployed and Host Nation Interaction: U.S.-ROK Cooperation under External Threat and Internal Frictions

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues external threat perception and internal friction dominate a government's cost-benefit analysis for hosting foreign troops. As a result, security cooperation between the Republic of Korea and United States varies with the degree of threat Seoul perceives from North Korea and the intensity of incidents related to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The ROK government's domestic political costs and perceived security benefits of the alliance produce a mix of nationalist and cooperative behavior toward the United States. The level of cooperation Seoul offers Washington shapes how effective and efficient the United States considers the alliance, which determines the ratio of American unilateral and cooperative behavior. How coordinated U.S. actions are with the ROK in turn affect Seoul's calculations of the costs and benefits of the alliance. This basic model of forward-deployed and host nation interaction is presented to account for post-Cold War patterns of cooperation between S...