Abstract
Fiscal recentralization in China in the 1990s introduced incentives that changed the form of corruption at the local government level from the helping-hand to the grabbing-hand type. Against the background of the experience of China, this paper describes how the central–local government revenue-sharing rule introduces strategic considerations that affect the form of corruption and thereby economic growth. Information regarding the possibilities for substitution in the form of corruption is shown to be relevant for decisions regarding fiscal centralization. However, the consequences of the decisions made in China suggest that such information was either not available or was not taken into account.
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