Booty Socialism, Bureau-Preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China

Abstract

Corruption by public officials has long been regarded as a cancer of polity, demoralizing and destablizing society and politics. It occurs in almost all societies, but often for different reasons and with varying consequences. Despite the flourishing of studies in recent years, we have yet to come to grips with the complexity and pervasiveness of corruption in contemporary China. For one thing, while some old patterns of corruption persist, new patterns have emerged. In this article, I address the issues of the changing role of the under reform and persistent bureaucratic indiscipline by focusing on one particular form of corruption, that by public agencies. For lack of a better term, I will call it organizational corruption. I believe the study of organizational corruption in China bears two sets of theoretical implications. First, it yields telling clues about the changing role of the in a transitional regime; second, it can afford us a better understanding of the nature of corruption. Two bodies of literature provide theoretical reference points for this paper. The first concerns the state's role in promoting economic development. Studies in this genre attempt to capture the nature of the in a reforming Communist regime. Though differing in their depictions of the state, scholars tend to base their view on the successful economic growth that China has experienced in recent years. They argue that, unlike the conventional belief held by neoclassical economists, the can adapt itself to the newly emerging markets and can even play an active role in leading marketization. This argument is different, however, from capitalist developmental states, where the structure of the economy and property rights is decidedly different. In what has been variously called the socialist developmental state',' corporatism,2 entrepreneurial state,3 and state entrepreneurialism,'4 the Chinese is portrayed as an adaptive and positive force in guiding the transformation of the economy. These studies usually focus on the growth-promoting and market-friendly role of the state, especially that of the local government. They treat the Chinese as distinct from both predatory states in developing countries mired in economic stagnation and developmental states in the East Asian newly industrializing economies. In China the acts as either an independent promoter of the local economy (as in the socialist developmental state) or a collaborator with local enterprises (as in corporatism) or an entrepreneur itself directly involved in profit-making activities (as in state entrepreneurialism).