Abstract
The subnational debt in Brazil was marked by successive bailouts by the federal government. The path of subnational debt induced some locals and state authorities to claim for further renegotiations. More specifically, some governors and mayors demanded a revision of the refinancing contracts. This article intends to present arguments sustained by simulations of the evolution of the path of the subnational debt, denying the necessity of changes in legal framework, which rules the state debt. The first section consists of a brief overview. The following section treats the institutional framework designed to safeguard the fiscal intertemporal balance. In the third section, the implications of new institutional framework on the subnational debt are approached; in the fourth, the possible causes that distorted the expected path of the debt are discussed. The fifth section analyses the future perspectives for the debt in general terms and focuses some specific cases, while the sixth section discusses the problem under a federal optics. Finally, the conclusion is presented.
Highlights
Federalism and subnational debt: a discussion on the sustainability of state debt
Muitas vezes a prática contradizia as regras estabelecidas, que buscavam conferir tratamento similar a entes altamente desiguais, seja politicamente, seja em termos econômicos
A falta de limites, a despeito de um notável aparato regulador, já observada em Rezende (1982), caracterizou a evolução do endividamento subnacional até recentemente
Summary
Federalism and subnational debt: a discussion on the sustainability of state debt. The subnational debt in Brazil was marked by successive bailouts by the federal government. O Programa de Reestruturação Fiscal e Financeira, parametrizado pela Lei 9.496/97, induziu as unidades da federação a implementarem uma reforma abrangente do Estado, em consonância com a esfera federal. Somente os estados de Minas Gerais, Alagoas e Pará arcaram com taxas de juros de 7,5% a.a., enquanto todos as demais unidades da federação tiveram sua dívida renegociada no âmbito da Lei 9.496/97 indexada a uma taxa de juros de 6% a.a. Em linhas gerais, o refinanciamento previa o pagamento de até 20% à vista, taxas de juros de 6% a 9% ao ano, cálculo das prestações baseado na Tabela Price, comprometimento de receita de 11,5% a 15% da Receita Corrente Líquida (ainda que tenham predominado os 13%). Gráfico 1: A lógica dos contratos de refinanciamento: comprometimento RLR x prestação Price
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