Abstract

The FDRE Constitution, formally, establishes federal form of state structure on the basis of ethno-territorial-linguistic criteria according to which nine regional states have been formed. Federalism, in turn, institutionalizes the division of power between federal and regional states that may render inter-governmental disputes in their interactions inevitably. The possibility of inter-governmental disputes, thus, necessitates the institutionalized inter-governmental dispute resolution mechanisms between these two tiers of governments. Being informed of federal characteristics, the Constitution extends the legislative, executive and judicial powers both for federal and regional governments. In equal footing, the Constitution further provides that both federal and regional states shall respect the power of one another. And the federal government may, whenever necessary, delegate to the states the power and functions granted to it by article 51 of the Constitution; leaving residual power (power given neither exclusively to either of them or concurrently to both of them) under the exclusive competence of the regional states. Though both federal and regional governments are constitutionally vested with different power and supposed to act distinctively and independently, overlapping of power between the two levels of governments is self-evident eventually. Be what it may, the FDRE Constitution has no specific provision dealing with intergovernmental relations in general and federal-regional dispute resolution mechanisms in particular though it is of crucial importance to subsist prime values of federalism and overcome the possibilities of intergovernmental disputes pragmatically. The objective of this article is, thus, to examine legal and institutional frameworks for federal-regional intergovernmental dispute resolution mechanisms in Ethiopian federacy and draw the conclusion that the necessity of having the institutionalized federal-regional intergovernmental dispute resolution mechanisms. In doing so, the article has employed comparative means and analysis of the related legal documents. To this end, the experiences of Kenyan, Nigerian and South African have been consulted so as they are found with the best lessons and practices in comparison. Finally, the article found out that there has been a need to have Federal-Regional Dispute Settlement Mechanism beyond board in Ethiopia.

Highlights

  • The Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia establishes federal form of state structure on the basis of ethno-territorial and linguistic line

  • The power of adjudicating all constitutional disputes may include umpiring federal-regional inter-governmental disputes based on the assumption that constitutional umpiring organ would naturally assume the power to umpire federal-regional disputes. This is self-evident fact when we look into the trends of Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa where Supreme Court, High Court and Constitutional Court have the power to umpire federal-regional disputes respectively

  • In the due course of devising institutionalism for power division, federalism gives rise for an intergovernmental relation, which could lead to dispute as a norm rather than an exception

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Summary

Introduction

The Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia ( after referred as “The Constitution”) establishes federal form of state structure on the basis of ethno-territorial and linguistic line. The overall division of power between federal and regional governments, at least theoretically, reveals the dual nature of Ethiopian federal state structure under which both federal and regional governments have distinctive and independent legislative, executive and judiciary.3 Under this framework, both federal and regional states are autonomous with their respective power and act independently in discharging their constitutional duties. The article is meant to examine the legal and institutional framework for federal-regional intergovernmental relation and dispute resolution mechanisms in Ethiopian federalism thoroughly. In doing so, it tries to look into the Constitutions of three African countries namely South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya for the comparative appraisal. Before making a comparative appraisal on Federal-regional intergovernmental dispute resolution mechanisms in Ethiopian federacy, the article has made an overview of intergovernmental relation in Ethiopia. The study is limited to the analysis of the constitutional, and other relevant legal provisions as the case may be

A Basic Circle of Intergovernmental Relation
Federal-Regional Intergovernmental Disputes
The Nigerian Experience
The South African Trends
Kenyan Experience
Intergovernmental Relation in Ethiopian Federacy
Concluding Remarks
Full Text
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