Abstract
Chapter 9 provides the outline of a general explanation of structural rationality in terms of non-structural requirements of rationality, i.e. rational requirements to respond to reasons. The general idea is that internal incoherence is not by itself forbidden by rationality, but only indicates that at least one of the attitudes involved is insufficiently supported by available reasons. It is argued that a successful explanation of this kind amounts to a vindication of the normativity of rationality (9.1), can accommodate the close connection between irrationality and incoherence (9.2), and avoids the problems of structural requirements of rationality (9.3). After discussing two important problems for the suggested approach (9.4), the chapter provides a detailed explanation of three different types of structural irrationality: akrasia (9.5), doxastic akrasia (9.6), and modus ponens irrationality (9.7).
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