The norms of practical reasoning

Abstract

What makes an episode of practical reasoning good? In one kind of view, practical reasoning succeeds just in case it leads the agent to do what she ought to do or to respond correctly to her reasons. Even if it is capricious, inconsistent, or habitual, it will count as good insofar as it hits its target. An alternative approach holds that reasoning can be assessed for its correctness independently of its outcome. The standard way of fleshing this out posits the existence of formal rational requirements. In this view, reasoning is good if it leads the agent to satisfy these structural requirements, independently of whether the result accords with what she actually ought to intend or do. But might there be norms of practical reasoning that do not just collapse into successful reasons-responsiveness or universal structural requirements? For instance, in certain contexts where the future is fairly predictable and resources are abundant, a norm that enjoins you to “stick to your plans” will be quite useful. In contexts that are unpredictable and resource scarce, however, this norm might not be as useful and thus not pass muster as a universal rational requirement. This chapter articulates a view in which there are genuine norms of practical reasoning that go beyond mere reasons-responsiveness but that are substantive, contingent, and context sensitive rather than universal and structural. We argue that such norms are needed to capture much of what is meant by “good practical reasoning.”