Experimental Validation of a Remedial Action via Hardware-in-the-Loop System Against Cyberattacks Targeting a Lab-Scale PV/Wind Microgrid

Abstract

This paper experimentally validates the effectiveness of a primary/backup framework in preventing/mitigating the impacts of false data injection (FDI) cyberattacks targeting a lab-scale wind/photovoltaic (PV) microgrid. As the primary mecha-nism, an artificial intelligence-based false data detection algorithm is proposed to forecast the upcoming measurements and alert the operator about the accuracy of sensors readings, directly collected from the field devices. Given that some FDI attacks are designed to bypass the utilized detection methods, it is essential to be prepared for such circumstances. Hence, as the backup mechanism, a remedial action scheme (RAS) is also introduced to mitigate the impacts of such malicious cyberattacks and keep the functionality of the microgrid. The proposed framework (i.e., FDI model, detection approach, and remedial action scheme) is developed as a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed within the cyber-physical structure of the smart microgrid. The experimental results validate 1) the negative impacts of modeled FDI attacks on the lab-scale microgrid, 2) the effectiveness of the developed false data detection technique, and 3) the efficiency of the proposed RAS to keep the normal operation of the targeted microgrid when the detection system fails to recognize the attack.