False Data Injection Attacks Against State Estimation in Multiphase and Unbalanced Smart Distribution Systems

Abstract

In power transmission systems, the false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation (SE) have been well studied. However, due to the unique features of power distribution systems including the low x/r ratio, existence of one-and/or two-phase branches, unbalanced load distributions, and unsymmetrical line parameters, the research on FDI attacks against distribution system state estimation (DSSE) is still open. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of DSSE to FDI attacks. In particular, we firstly propose a local state-based linear DSSE for multiphase and unbalanced smart distribution systems, which can facilitate the construction of FDI attacks numerically with the least information of system states. Then, the construction of three-phase coupled FDI attacks is introduced. The consideration of the coupling among phases by the three-phase coupled FDI attacks may require the modification of a large number of measurements by the attackers. To reduce the number of required measurements, the perfect three-phase decoupled FDI attacks, which consider the weak couplings among phases, is investigated. The probabilities of successful three-phase decoupled FDI attacks in strongly three-phase coupled systems are also derived numerically. The performance of the proposed FDI attacks against DSSE is evaluated based on IEEE test feeders. The case study results indicate the feasibility of the FDI attacks against DSSE in practical multiphase and unbalanced smart distribution systems. Future research directions including potential countermeasures are also highlighted.