Excess and Withdrawal: Critical Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

Dustin Zielke

doi:10.22329/p.v12i2.5035

Abstract

This paper takes up the problem of correlationism from a phenomenological perspective. Speculative realists, such as Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman, seek to establish new forms of Continental realism largely because, in their view, phenomenology cannot adequately account for the real. To counter these claims, I will use what I call a “critical phenomenological approach”, which critically delimits the real from the intentional relation, and thus makes possible a phenomenological theory of the real. This approach to realism establishes not only that the real is independent from the intentional relation but also that the intentional relation itself is contingent with regard to the real. Furthermore, it also shows that the human being is exposed to the real in an originary way that calls into question the adequacy of Meillassoux’s and Harman’s forms of realism.

Highlights

Speculative realists and phenomenologists have recently had a strained relationship
As many who are familiar with speculative realism already know, it takes its starting point from the so-called “problem of correlationism.”
Harman is indebted to Meillassoux’s articulation of the problem of correlationism, he takes it in a different direction, developing a unique position in speculative realism

Summary

Introduction

Speculative realists and phenomenologists have recently had a strained relationship. For speculative realists, such as Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman, phenomenology is part of a correlationist tradition in philosophy that cannot adequately offer a realist approach. According to Meillassoux and Harman, we need to pass beyond the phenomenological tradition to adequately attend to the real—to those things that are ontologically independent from the intentional relation. The sense of realness “ascribed” to real things in the intentional relation does not ontologically nullify the objective realness or independence referred to through this sense To develop this argument, I take an approach that I call, for lack of a better term, “critical phenomenology.”. I will show that the human being neither needs absolute knowledge about the real nor a complete skepticism of the appearance of the real in order to be exposed to the real This exposure— finite—is ontologically and experientially prior to these speculative demands. This struggle occurs before any speculative thought since real beings, such as human beings, need to first learn to survive this exposure before they have the luxury of speculating about it

Speculative Realism and Correlationism

Correlationism and “Critical” Phenomenology

The Phenomenology of the Real

The Real and the Human

Conclusion