Evolving U.S. satellite export policy: Implications for missile nonproliferation and U.S. national interests

Abstract

The new U.S. policy of export of United Sates‐built satellites to foreign launcher providers has been in force since March 15, 1999. The new tough approach primarily affects China, Russia, and Ukraine, countries that had been launching U.S. satellites in the past and already have been slotted for future launches. The signals emanating from these three countries suggest that they are willing to comply with missile nonproliferation norms as long as they are financially reimbursed for that through space cooperation with the United States. If space cooperation, and consequently revenues, declines, these nations may start considering exports of proliferation concern, and the United States will have much weaker leverage in bargaining with them. The new restrictions may undermine seriously the credibility of the Missile Technology Control Regime and provide disincentives for potential members with developed space programs (e.g., China and India) to join the regime.