Evolutionary Tripartite Game Model in the Coal Mine Risk-Hazard Double Pre-Control and Management in China

Abstract

The classification, investigation, and management of the safety risk (namely, risk-hazard double pre-control management mechanism) in coal mines were introduced into a behavioral evolution game to assess the decision-making processes of coal mine workers, regulators, and supervisors. A tripartite game tree and a revenue perception matrix were constructed, and the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) achieved by the evolutionary system under different conditions was obtained according to the replication dynamic equation (RD). The numerical simulation of the evolution game was conducted in MATLAB, which verified the influence of various parameters on the behaviors adopted by all parties. The results show: (1) When the safety, regulatory, and supervisory costs are high, the average expected value of mine workers, regulators, and supervisors to choose safety behaviors is low, so they adopt an unsafe behavior. By contrast, reducing costs can encourage the adoption of safety behaviors. (2) When the punishment for accident losses caused by unsafe behavior and the lack of regulations and supervision is higher than 50% of the initial state, the actors in the tripartite game are more inclined to avoid risks when facing cost losses in the short term, which can lead them to choose a safety behavior. (3) When the actors in the tripartite game face different accident probabilities and accident loss, with the severity of the accident increasing to 80% of the initial state, mine workers and regulators gradually adopt safety and regulation behaviors, and supervisors quickly adopt supervision methods.