Could the Management System of Safety Partnership Change Miners’ Unsafe Behavior?

Abstract

This paper analyzes the management system of safety partnership in coal mining enterprises through the methods of evolutionary game and optimized behavioral propagation of SEIR, considering the miners’ benefits and losses, as well as the influencing factors from miners and enterprises. It is found that, under the influence of the management system of safety partnership within miners, after the evolutionary game between miner partners, the behavioral strategies and personal benefits of the two miners are both consistent. Moreover, the benefits of individual miner and overall benefits of two miner partners, will affect the miners’ choice of safe behavioral strategies, as a result of which, the coal mines could improve the miners’ benefits through the management system of safety partnership to stimulate the implementation of miners’ safe behavior. Additionally, under the incentive of the management system of the safety partnership, the number of miners implementing unsafe behavior is decreasing, while the number of miners who are not easily affected by unsafe behavior is increasing. When the rewards and punishments of miners are strengthened, the propagation of miners’ safe behavior is accelerated. Finally, the propagation of miners’ safe behavior has a certain spillover effect within a certain range. The results of this paper provide a theoretical basis for the implementation of the management system of safety partnership in coal mining enterprises, which helps enterprises in guiding miners to take up safe behavior, which is better for enterprises’ safe development.